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DISABLING AMERICA: THE "RIGHTS INDUSTRY"
IN OUR TIME. By Richard E. Morgan.t New York: Basic
Books, Inc. 1984. Pp. 245. $16.95.

TRADITION AND MORALITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: THE FRANCIS BOYER LECTURES ON PUBLIC
POLICY. By Robert H. Bork.2 American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1984. Pp. 11. $3.00.
Carl Auerbach3
Relatively few political scientists today specialize in questions
of constitutional policy. With Judge Bork, I lament the fact that
law, including constitutional law, "is an arena of ideas that is too
often ignored by intellectuals interested in public policy."4 This is a
pity because the interaction of these intellectuals and legal scholars
would enrich the literature on law and public policy. Professor
Richard E. Morgan's book is a notable and welcome addition to
that literature.
Professor Morgan was academically trained in "political philosophy, constitutional law, and that stream of political science that
deals with the interaction of organized groups in society."s In his
capacity as a student of constitutional law, Professor Morgan devotes most of his book to a critical analysis of the major decisions
dealing with religion, racial desegregation, due process in public
schools, and affirmative action. Writing as a political philosopher,
he disputes the legitimacy of the "noninterpretivist" mode of constitutional adjudication that he holds responsible for these decisions.
Though little he says is new, Morgan's criticism is lively, biting, and
lucid. His special contribution is made in his third role, that of a
student of "the interaction of organized groups in society." Morgan
blames the "rights industry" for manufacturing new constitutional
rights that disregard the claims of organized society. These new
individual rights, he charges, have disabled America by isolating the
churches from society, destabilizing the schools, enfeebling law enI.
2.
3.
4.
5.

William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Constitutional Law, Bowdoin College.
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forcement, undermining public order and preempting private
decisionmaking.
This review will first consider Morgan's attack on the rights
industry. It will then evaluate his attack Goined by Judge Bork) on
noninterpretivism. Finally, it will suggest a significant contribution
that social scientists like Morgan could make.
I

Morgan tries to tell us "who are these people"6 that constitute
the "rights industry" and how they are responsible for the Supreme
Court decisions having these bad effects. His answers are not satisfying. In general terms, Morgan describes the "rights industry" as
a "set of specialized elites professionally concerned with" rights and
liberties, including "interest group advocates, law professors, activist lawyers and publicists," but mostly lawyers, who may be identified by their politics. 1
In essence, Morgan charges that the "rights industry" is composed of "idealists of the left" who "broadly" share ten political
tenets he sets forth. These tenets demonstrate that they are "profoundly" and "overwhelmingly" "disaffected from American culture and society," and "because of their disaffection . . . feel free to
lumber that society with new and expensive rights."s The only support Morgan gives for these assertions is a survey of 157 individuals
who represent a cross section of the public interest elite, including
leaders or top staffers of seventy-four organizations as well as major
public interest law firms,9 and who, according to Morgan, overlap
substantially with the "rights industry."w
Morgan then specifically mentions only the ACLU, Center for
Law and Social Policy, Children's Defense Fund ("a specialized and
especially zany rights industry formation") and the Women's Legal
Defense Fund. II Although civil rights groups, such as the NAACP
6. Id. at 191.
7. See id. at 6, 3, 199, 191, respectively.
8. ld. at 192, 194-95.
9. /d. at 196. The survey referred to is Lichter & Rothman, What Interests the Public
and What Interests the Public Interests, PUB. OPINION, Apr.-May 1983, at 44. The quotation
from the report of the survey is at 45. Professors Lichter and Rothman describe the 157
leaders of the public interest groups and firms they surveyed as "overwhelmingly young,
highly educated, well-paid professionals, with secular and liberal outlooks and democratic
voting habits." Id. at 45. They see the public interest movement as "the purest political
expression" of the "new liberalism" that remains concerned with "matters of economic privilege and privation" but "centers on newer social, cultural, and 'life style' issues." /d. at 44.
10. R. MoRGAN, supra note 5, at 196.
II. /d. The characterization of the Children's Defense Fund is at p. 70. Professors
Lichter and Rothman also mention that Common Cause, Congress Watch, Consumers'
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and Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights were not included in the
survey, Morgan does not think "this omission affects the results
significantly. "12
In other contexts, Morgan specifies other groups and individuals. In connection with the Supreme Court decisions on the religion
clauses, the "rights industry" includes the ACLU, NAACP, Protestants and Other Americans United for the Separation of Church
and State, the American Jewish Congress, the General Conference
of Seventh Day Adventists, the Order of United American Mechanics, the National Education Association, Paul Blanshard (who expressed "the postwar anti-Catholicism of the American left"), Leo
Pfeffer (the "archetypical rights professional"), R. Freeman Butts,
V.T. Thayer, Alvin L. Johnson, Irving Brant and Joseph L. Blau.
For the school busing cases, the "rights industry" includes not
only the many private groups interested in civil rights that make up
the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights but also the "rights industry professionals within the federal government," particularly
the United States Civil Rights Commission.n Morgan also names
certain law professors who "were aligned with the fabricators of the
constitutional requirement of integration as partners in a common
enterprise" - Owen M. Fiss, Ronald Dworkin, and David L.
Kirp.l4 Still other groups are named as part of the "affirmative action" sector of the rights industry - the National Committee on
Pay Equity, National Organization of Women, the Women's Legal
Defense Fund, and the Society of American Law Teachers.1s
Other law professors are named as leaders of the rights industry seeking to extend the constitutional rights of the accused Yale Kamisar (the "Leader of the Mirandists"), Anthony Amsterdam (a "rights industry superstar") and Laurence H. Tribe ("the
very model of an activist professor"). Though Morgan grants in a
footnote that the law schools are not monolithic, he thinks "rights
radicalism" dominates the law schools and that this has led to the
"extensive interpenetration of legal education and the rights
industry."J6
Union, Critical Mass, Environmental Defense Fund, and Public Citizen were included in the
public interest groups they surveyed.
12. /d.
13. See id. at 37, 39, 14, 32-41, 54-55, respectively. I assume Morgan would no longer
describe the Civil Rights Commission in this fashion. Morgan holds "rights industry" professionals responsible for Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. _1 _(19_7~).
"along with the law clerks of the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court and thetr judicial
principals." R MORGAN, supra note 5, at 57.
14. /d. at 58-60.
15. Id. at 153, 154-55.
16. Id. at 89, 115, 122, 165.
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What does all this amount to? Morgan admits that the "rights
industry" is not "centrally directed."J7 Indeed, the cast of culprits
changes from constitutional issue to constitutional issue, though
some characters may appear in a number of productions. What
unites the groups and individuals named by Morgan is merely that
they instigated litigation, filed briefs amici curiae, or wrote articles
urging the courts to make decisions Morgan deplores.1s
One may speak of an "antirights industry" in the same sense.
And some groups, like the American Jewish Committee and the
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai Brith, are in the rights industry
on some issues and the antirights industry on others. Nor is there
any evidence that the antirights industry commands fewer legal and
other resources than the rights industry. The contrary is probably
the truth.J9
Only the Supreme Court, not the rights industry, "manufactures" rights, and the rights industry has not always been successful
in its strivings. Morgan's analysis of the politics of the rights industry does not help us to understand why the Supreme Court has responded to it, and not to the antirights industry, in the cases
Morgan criticizes. Surely Morgan is not implying that the Justices
responsible for these decisions are also "idealists of the left" who
are profoundly disaffected from American society. This description
also does not fit every group and individual Morgan includes in the
"rights industry," however accurate it may be for some of them at
one time or another.2o I find greater explanatory power in Profes17. /d. at 34.
18. See id. at 3, 12, liS, 148.
19. For example, in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I (1947), the School Board of
the Township of Ewing, as Morgan points out, supra note 5, at 14, was represented by the
state (New Jersey) Attorney General's Office and a partner in Davis, Polk. In addition, six
other states filed briefs supporting New Jersey and Ewing. /d. at 14.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), amici curiae briefs supporting affirmance of
the convictions were filed on behalf of twenty-seven states, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands,
and the National District Attorneys Association.
In United Steel Workers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), amici curiae briefs
urging affirmance of the holding below that employment preferences based upon race violated
Title VII's prohibition against racial discrimination in employment were filed by the AntiDefamation League of B'nai Brith, California Correctional Officers Association, Government
Contract Employers Association, Pacific Legal Foundation, Polish American Congress,
Southwestern Legal Foundation, and United States Justice Foundation.
Amici curiae briefs in University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978),
urging affirmance of the California Supreme Court's decision that the special admissions program of the Davis medical school was invalid under the equal protection clause were filed by
the American Federation of Teachers, American Jewish Committee, American Subcontractors Association, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai Brith, Fraternal Order of Police, Order of
Sons of Italy, Pacific Legal Foundation, Queens Jewish Community Council, and Young
Americans for Freedom.
20. I think Morgan recognizes this. He acknowledges that the "civil libertarian enter-
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sor Nathan Glazer's insight that "the nature of the law itself emphasizes many themes that have become the essence of liberalism:
due process, a careful consideration of rights, a system of reasoning
by analogy, which permits moving from restricted conceptions of
due process to more extended ones. "21 But I do not think even this
is the whole story. Nor does Professor Glazer.
II

Morgan's indictment of "noninterpretivism" is a powerful one,
which Judge Bork joins. Yet the positions taken by both reveal the
difficulties of "interpretivism."
Judge Bork believes "[w]e are entering ... a period in which
our legal culture and constitutional law may be transformed, with
even more power accruing to judges than is presently the case." He
attributes this development to the "fact ... that the law [including
constitutional law] possesses very little theory about itself," about
"the sources of law, or its capacities and limits, or the prerequisites
for its vitality." Consequently, legal scholars "are becoming increasingly converted to an ideology of the Constitution that demands . . . an infusion of extraconstitutional moral and political
notions." "[N]ew theories of moral relativism and egalitarianism"
dominate "constitutional thinking in a number of leading law
schools." These theories "are increasingly abstract and philosophical; they are sometimes nihilistic; they always lack what law requires, democratic legitimacy." Judges who are instructed they
"may· properly reason to constitutional decisions" by applying "abstractions of moral philosophy," rather than the "historical Constitution," are "being educated to engage in really heroic adventures
in policy making." When these abstractions fail to achieve desired
results, constitutional "nihilism" nevertheless advocates the use of
judicial power to produce them. Thus, "[c]onstitutional scholarship
today is dominated by the creation of arguments that will encourage
judges to thwart democractic choice." This scholarship, Judge
Bork charges, conflicts with the views of the "majority of living
Americans about where the balance between individual freedom
prise" is important to America's development and its future, (supra note 5, at 6), the "rights
industry" has an "honorable history of opposing and curbing" "serious abuses of public and
private power in America" (id. at 213), "there is much that is admirable about the people and
groups" he criticizes, (icl. at 214), and the disabling of major private and governmental institutions has been "largely unintended by them" (icl. at I). But he concludes that the "rights
industry" in our time "needs to moderate and ideologically detoxify itself in order to serve
effectively as guardian of the open society rather than its traducers." /d. at 214.
21. Glazer, Lawyers, the New Class, and the Constitution, 2 CoNsr. CoMM. 27, 37
(1985).
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and social order lies. "22
Like Judge Bork, I deplore the antimajoritarianism of much
current constitutional scholarship. I wish we would curb our
desires for immediate results and stop looking to the Supreme Court
to act as an instrument of social change. But choosing between interpretivism and noninterpretivism will do little to resolve disputes
over the merits of particular opinions.
Even if we possessed the most complete theory about law's
sources, its capacities and limits and the prerequisites for its vitality
(and I think Judge Bork underestimates how much of such theory
we do have), we would still have to go to fields of learning outside
the law in order to evaluate it. Indeed, legal scholars must resort to
other intellectual disciplines to develop theories about law's capacities and limits and the prerequisites for its vitality. However one
may value process, criteria for evaluating outcomes are also necessary. The "law and economics" movement, for example, uses abstract theory for this purpose, without apparent objection from
Judge Bork.
Judge Bork may not be as much troubled by the infusion of
"extraconstitutional moral and political notions" into constitutional
adjudication as by the infusion of particular notions he finds anathema. For he quotes Richard John Neuhaus's statement that "[l]aw
that is recognized as legitimate is . . . organically related to . . .
the larger universe of moral discourse that helps share human behavior. In short, if law is not also a moral enterprise, it is without
legitimacy or binding force."23 I find Neuhaus's statement unexceptionable, but obviously the "larger universe of moral discourse"
is "extraconstitutional."
Judge Bork tries to reconcile Neuhaus's statement with his
own views by insisting that in "a constitutional democracy the
moral content of law must be given by the moraJity of the framer or
the legislator, never by the morality of the judge. "24 Morgan
agrees.2s
Here lies the difficulty. Law and morals may conflict. Existing
law may be immoral when judged by criteria supplied by the "larger
universe of moral discourse." Take Griswold v. Connecticut,26 in
which the Court rejected the morality of the legislator and invalidated a Connecticut statute making it a crime for married persons
22. For the quoted language, see R. BoRK, supra note 4, at 2-3, 5-9.
23. /d. at II.
24. /d.
25. R. MORGAN, supra note 5, at 177 (the morality that the law should enforce "is the
legislatively ratified conventional morality").
26. 381 u.s. 479 (1965).
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to use contraceptives. The decision may have reflected the individual morality of each of the Justices in the majority. But is there any
doubt that the Connecticut statute violated the standards of morality shared by the American people? To insist that the legislator's
morality should govern in such a case would indeed divorce constitutional law from the "larger universe of moral discourse."21 Interpretivism offers no guide to the Justices in such a situation.
Neither Judge Bork nor Professor Morgan are strict interpretivists. Morgan "does not insist that the meaning of a constitutional
provision is fixed forever by the immediate concerns of the framers
or bound in hoops of steel by history." Unlike Raoul Berger, he
justifies Brown v. Board of Education on interpretivist grounds. But
his interpretivism allows only for "controlled innovation"; he insists
that the Court must "create new constitutional rights by interpretation of the text or some known (or discoverable) tradition of prior
understanding of what the text means." But what "successive generations took [particular] constitutional provisions to mean" may at
successive times have involved innovation and new policymaking.
Why should this process end with any particular generation?2s
Judge Bork does not elaborate his views of "interpretivism."
In this lecture, he says judges should govern according to the "historical Constitution" and accept "the proposition that the framers'
intentions with respect to freedoms are the sole legitimate premise
from which constitutional analysis may proceed." But proceed it
may, and so Judge Bork calls for "theory that relates the framers'
values to today's world. "29 I find it impossible to see how such a
theory can avoid resorting to fields of learning outside the law, or
how judges may avoid the influence of their own moral values in
developing and applying any such theory. The objective moral
standards Americans share are not static. By their decisions, judges
may draw moral issues into public discussion, and a new consensus
may emerge. In any case, I do not find "interpretivism" or
"noninterpretivism" as expounded by their respective adherents
helpful in defining the scope and limits of constitutional policymaking by judges in a democratic society.
27. Nor is it quite fair for Judge Bork (supra note 4, at 3-4) to charge that Justice
Harlan's opinion in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), reflects moral relativism. Justice
Harlan appreciated the need for civility in political discourse in a democracy. Nevertheless,
he held that the first amendment prohibited government from trying to enforce civility. See
Farber, Civilizing Public Discourse, 1980 DUKE L.J. 283. I doubt that the objective standards
of morality that Americans share would condemn Cohen's actions as "immoral," though
many might well view it as offensively rude.
28. R. MoRGAN, supra note 5, at 166-70.
29. R. BoRK, supra note 4, at 7, 10.
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III
Disputes about the merits of the particular constitutional policies Morgan attacks may be clarified, if not resolved, by considering
their social consequences. Morgan's major thesis is that these policies are disabling America by imposing monetary and other costs
that render major American institutions "less able to pursue excellence in performing their primary function."3o Yet he devotes relatively few pages to proving his thesis. He presents little evidence
that major American institutions are less effective than they used to
be, let alone evidence on the extent to which the Court is to blame
for any decrease in effectiveness. Morgan argues that it is "puerile"
to "respond to an argument about a particular social cost with the
defense of multivariant causality."3I But I am not suggesting that
the fact of multivariant causality itselfjustifies the imposition by the
Supreme Court of any additional social cost; only that a more informed evaluation of the Court's decisions would be possible with
data permitting a balance to be struck of their costs and benefits,
including those that cannot be assessed quantitatively.
Thus, for example, Morgan blames the decisions on the religion clauses for depriving the nation "of the option of enlisting
church-related social service institutions (a large and richly experienced institutional sector) in implementing public programs"; and
making "it difficult for government to act through private sector
institutions at all," because "legislators are often unwilling to vote
for programs utilizing private sector institutions if the church-related institutions, which loom large in their particular constituencies must be left out."32 But other legislators may often be
unwilling to vote for programs utilizing private sector institutions if
church-related institutions must be included. And some legislators,
as in Minnesota,33 may vote to aid nonparochial private schools
only in order to aid parochial schools. Morgan gives us no basis for
assessing the overall impact of these conflicting attitudes.
To the constitutional constraints against financial aid, Morgan
also attributes the possibility that private schools, including church
schools, may go out of business.34 Yet some of these constitutional
constraints, particularly the school prayer and Bible reading cases,
may have resulted in an expansion of the parochial school system,
even among Protestant groups. Again, Morgan gives no basis for
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

R. MORGAN, supra note 5, at 7.
/d. at 9.
/d. at 41.
Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
R. MORGAN, supra note 5, at 42.
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assessing these conflicting possibilities, let alone the social costs of
separating children by religion during their most formative years.
Morgan asserts that few positive educational benefits have resulted from "heroic integration measures" and holds the Supreme
Court decisions requiring busing responsible for the "ravages of
white flight and resegregation of the school systems of larger cities
(and many middle sized cities)."Js Here he relies upon the work of
David J. Armor and Nancy St. John.36
In fact, social scientists disagree as to the effects of school integration and mandatory busing. Morgan does not independently
evaluate the work that has been done but simply accepts that which
supports his contentions.37
To the "wrong headed and sometimes vindictive pursuit of racial balance and the utopian conception of children's rights" Morgan attributes, in significant measure, the "erosion of the moral
authority of teachers, administrators and parents" which, in tum,
accounts for the "disappointing contemporary performance of
American public education."Js No evidence is presented concerning the erosion of moral authority or the extent to which the
Supreme Court decisions are responsible therefor. The factors that
may account for the inadequacies of public education are indeed
multiple. Morgan acknowledges some ofthem-"[t]rendy egalitarianism, abandonment of the fundamental subjects in pursuit of fashionable ephemera, and the inferior educations received by so many
teachers in their universities."39 Other factors may be equally important-such as the social and psychological problems children
suffer (including depression and lack of concentration) because of
hunger, poverty, divorce, abuse, and drugs.40 What is the weight of
the Supreme Court's decisions on procedural due process in the
35. /d. at 60.
36. Armor, The Evidence on Busing, PUB. INTERESf, Summer 1972, at 90; The Double
Standard: A Reply, PUB. INTERESf, Winter 1973, at 119; N. ST. JOHN, ScHOOL DESEGREGATION: OUTCOMES FOR CHILDREN (1975); The Effects of School Desegregation on Children: aRe-Review of Research Evidence (October 1977) (paper presented to the American
Academy of Arts and Sciences Study Group on Urban School Desegregation).
37. The various studies that had been done up to 1978 are cited in Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration, and Social Science Research in the Supreme
Court, 42 L. & CoNTEMP. PROB., particularly at 57, 61-63, 59 n.l4, 61-62 n.27-33 (1978).
See also Hawley, The New Mythology of School Desegregation, 42 L. & CoNTEMP. PROB. 214,
228 (1978). As "the most thorough and careful pro-busing response," Morgan cites G.
0RFIELD, MuST WE Bus? (1978), with the con:ment that he will"leave it to the judgment of
anyone up to Orfield's 450 pages to judge how well his arguments stand up six years later."
R. MoRGAN, supra note 5, at 221 n.35.
38. R. MoRGAN, supra note 5, at 73.
39. /d.
40. See generally The Human Factor: A Key to Excellence in Education, 1985 Report of
the National Association of Social Workers.

1985]

BOOK REVIEWS

487

public schools in the midst of all these factors? How shall we assess
the benefits these decisions confer?
The same difficulties reappear in Morgan's discussion of the
Supreme Court decisions that he maintains have enfeebled law enforcement and the maintenance of public order. He recognizes that
[b]asic social factors such as the size of the youth cohort relative to the rest of the
population, rural to urban migrations, and the extent to which nongovernmental
institutions (families, churches and neighborhood groups) operate effectively and
self-confidently on the basis of an accepted morality to discourage deviance, have
greater impact on crime rates than the numbers of police, their level of professionalism, or whether judges are tough or permissive.41

Nevertheless, although "we do not have high levels of crime and
disorder because law enforcement is weak," weak law enforcement
"will leave the community both psychologically and physically vulnerable to a degree beyond that decreed by demographic, economic,
and social forces over which we (properly) have little control" and
"ultimately corrode the bonds of trust between people and
government. "42
One may agree with everything Morgan says about the great
value of the "marginal benefits" to be derived from improved law
enforcement. Yet questions would remain whether the Supreme
Court has in fact weakened law enforcement and handicapped the
maintenance of public order; and, if so, to what extent, and, finally,
whether that is a reasonable price to pay for the benefits that accrue
from expanding the constitutional rights of the accused. On these
questions, Morgan proffers no evidence.
What I ask for may tax the capacities of social scientists, particularly if they are expected to help the Supreme Court make particular decisions. More can be expected of them in assessing the
consequences of these decisions. The task will be more manageable
if more social scientists become interested in the legal order and its
role in the larger social order. Only by undertaking this task can
social scientists make a special contribution to the illumination of
constitutional policy making.
41.
42.

R. MORGAN, supra note 5, at 74-75.
/d. at 75-96.

